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This paper offers a theoretical model which focuses on cultural bargaining behavior. It is
based  on an intercultural negotiation framework of activity-based cultural types (Ott, 2011).
The  complexities of international negotiations are analyzed from a multi-active bargaining
perspective which considers negotiation-is-an-art model. The results show the multi-active
bargaining types from a seller and a buyer perspective. The differences in international
negotiation behavior show the problems of cultural collisions. The possibility to circum-
vent these clashes is at the core of this article. The analysis proves useful as the different
time perceptions, cultural activity levels and the resulting strategic behavior are clearly
related to the deadlocks, stalemates, break-ups and agreements experienced in real-life
scenarios. The application of the model to UK-Malaysian negotiation experiments is an
example of the robustness of the theoretical results. This paper offers solutions to negotia-
tions  in an intercultural context and opens the black box of the uncertainty about cultural
incompatibilities.
©  2016 Journal of Innovation & Knowledge. Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Este estudio ofrece un modelo teórico que se centra en el comportamiento negociador cul-
tural  basado en una negociación intercultural sobre actividades culturales (Ott, 2011). Las
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complejidades de las negociaciones internacionales se analizan desde una perspectiva de
negociación múltiple que considera un modelo de “la negociación es un arte.” Los resultados
muestran los tipos de negociación multi-activa desde el punto de vista de un comprador y unvendedor. Las diferencias de comportamiento en la negociación intercultural demuestran
los  problemas de los choques culturales. Este artículo se centra en la posibilidad de evitar
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esos choques. La validez del análisis se ve reﬂejada en cómo las diferencias de percepción
temporal, niveles de actividad cultural y el comportamiento estratégico resultante están
claramente relacionados con los puntos muertos, acuerdos y rotura de las negociaciones
que  se dan en situaciones reales. La aplicación del modelo a experimentos de negociación
entre el Reino Unido y Malasia pone de maniﬁesto la solidez de los resultados teóricos.
Este  artículo ofrece soluciones a las negociaciones interculturales y revela el problema de
la  incertidumbre en cuanto a incompatibilidades culturales.
©  2016 Journal of Innovation & Knowledge. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L.U. Este es
un artículo Open Access bajo la licencia CC BY-NC-NDIntroduction
‘Consider ﬁrst a Bazaar: a buyer would arrive at a shop, bar-
gain with the seller and might after a while indicate that
he is about to leave and look for another shop. It is com-
monplace for the seller to shout after the leaving customer
and make a last price offer. Indeed, no self-respecting seller
would allow a customer to leave without making a last offer
(Shaked, 1994, p. 421/422)’.
Modeling a bazaar is one way of showing interactions at
the marketplace which reaches from such immediate levels of
co-operation and conﬂict to more  sophisticated negotiations
of virtual high-tech bargaining scenarios. Contrary to Shaked
(1994) who  moved away from bazaar to model high-tech mar-
ket bargaining, Rapoport, Erev, and Zwick (1995) used a model
of a ‘Tunisian Bazaar’ mechanism. As these papers show a sim-
ilarity in the bargaining procedures of haggling bargainers, we
use this as a starting point to show differences in the ﬁrst offer,
acceptance and rejection between different groups of cultures.
In a bazaar the incompatibilities of different cultural bargain-
ing types are most obvious between cultures with a haggling
approach, on the one hand, and those with a short-term or
those with a more  patient approach, on the other hand.
One thing which is common to all modes of negotiating is
a cultural cognitive program, which accompanies interaction
and procedures in a globalized business world. The outcome
of international and intercultural negotiations for manage-
rial purposes is strongly determined by an inherent set of
different values, beliefs, attitudes and norms which is often
difﬁcult to detect and about which it is difﬁcult to be cer-
tain. The necessary evidence for strengthening the cultural
negotiation types came from empirical investigations (Adair
& Brett, 2004, 2005; Chaney & Martin, 2004; Graham, 1985;
Graham & Mintu-Wimsat, 1997; Graham, Mintu, & Rodgers,
1994; Salacuse, 1999). These studies pointed to different bar-
gaining strategies of US, Japanese and Brazilian cultures.
In a recent publication Ott (2011) introduced an inter-
cultural negotiation framework which considers the clash
between linear-active, multi-active and reactive bargaining
strategies. This paper develops the concept presented in the
cultural activity framework (Ott, 2011) further and assumes
a one-sided incomplete information scenario for sellers and
buyers with a multi-active approach. The characteristics of
a haggling approach can generally be seen in a high offer,
frequent rejection of offers and a longer bargaining horizon(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
(Ott, 2011). Ott (2011) provides a basis for further research.
The cooperation/conﬂict scenarios are not considered in an
incomplete information setting, which can be very likely in
import/export negotiations or any other foreign direct invest-
ment cases when a host culture is unsure about the expat
managers or MNE HQ relationship with their subsidiary.
This paper contributes to the literature of international
negotiations in several ways. First, we  try to emphasize the
multi-active bargaining behavior in buyer–seller negotiations.
Second, we integrate these cultural activity types with bar-
gaining games of one-sided incomplete information. Third, we
apply our theoretical analysis to a UK-Malaysian experiment.
Though the paper uses a formal analysis, the propositions are
followed by the intuition to show the practical relevance.
International  negotiations
In this article, we continue in the tradition of Raiffa (1982, with
Raiffa, Richarson, & Metcalfe, 2002) and Sebenius (1992, 2009)
who called for negotiation analysis which integrates theoret-
ical bargaining models with real-life negotiation scenarios.
Co-operation and conﬂict are the essence of negotiations and
are also the point of tension in game theoretical reasoning. We
need to consider a dynamic perspective with the respective
solution concept to combine the descriptive and prescriptive
negotiation perspectives.
The literature review deals with the theoretical underpin-
ning of international negotiation styles and bargaining models
of one-sided incomplete information. It therefore combines
both streams of literature with an empirical negotiation back-
ground and a theoretical bargaining approach.
International  negotiation  styles
The literature of international negotiations is replete with
examples of negotiation styles (Graham, 1985; Gelfand & Brett,
2004; Ghauri & Usunier, 2003; Thompson, Neale, & Sinaceur,
2004, inter alia) of different distinct cultural patterns such
as US, Japanese and Brazilians. The scope of literature con-
siders the art and science of negotiations, the psychology
of negotiations and the international business and interna-
tional relations perspectives on negotiations. A variety of
negotiation models and frameworks deal with negotiation
behavior which can be found in the international business lit-
erature (Fayerweather & Kapoor, 1976; Graham, 1987; Ghauri &
Usunier, 2003; Ott, 2011; Tung, 1982; Weiss, 1993), game theory
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iterature (Raiffa, 1982; Schelling, 1960) and social psychology
iterature (Deutsch, 1973; Gelfand & Brett, 2004; Pruitt, 1981).
ombining culture, negotiation and game theory is the focus
f this paper. We  consider ﬁrst the theoretical underpinning
or culture and negotiation styles in that respect.
Understanding cultural behavior and co-operation (Chen,
hen, & Meindl, 1998; Fang, 2006; Hall, 1976; Hofstede, 1991,
001) explains differences in negotiation styles and outcomes
ave been explicated for many  decades. Whether cooperative
r non-cooperative strategies are used in negotiation is deter-
ined by cultural evolution and schemes (Calabuig & Olcina,
009; Chuah, Hoffmann, Jones, & Williams, 2007; Cordes,
icherson, McElreath, & Strimling, 2008; Hennig-Schmidt, Li,
 Yang, 2008). The negotiation process belonging to the most
asic cultural programs has been analyzed in experiments and
t can be considered as a dynamic concept. We  therefore use
 time lens to show the differences and more  importantly its
mplications for intercultural negotiations.
Usunier’s (2003a, 2003b) contrasts time models between
he Western (linear, economic time) and Eastern Asian time
atterns (cyclical-integrated time). In general, the time hori-
on directly or indirectly plays a crucial role in international
egotiations – especially the contrast between the long-term
rientation of Asian, Arab and African cultures inﬂuence
egotiations versus the short-term perspectives of Western
ocieties. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2009) contrasted the
hort-termist ‘Time is money’ perspective with the one of
nthropologists who insisted that the ‘convertibility of time
nd money is circumscribed by norms and values’ (p. 96). Their
esults with Swedish participants in an experiment showed
hat subjects are more  prone to make non-monetary sacri-
ces than to make monetary ones. Further there are different
egrees of long-term and short-term orientation. Uncertainty
bout these types is a characteristic of international bargain-
ng. Compared to the literature on negotiation styles of US
mericans, Japanese and Chinese, the way cultural behav-
or affects negotiation strategies of multi-active players has
ot been analyzed extensively so far. Robinson, Lewicki, and
onahue (2000) found clear differences in the bargaining
actics between Asian, Latin American, USA and Western
uropean groups on the ﬁve factor scales. The ﬁve factors com-
rised competitive bargaining, attacking opponent’s network,
alse promises, misrepresentation and inappropriate info
athering which showed clear differences in cultural patterns.
t becomes clear that using a multi-active bargaining perspec-
ive in contrast to the Western and Far Eastern behavior would
pen the black box of cultural clashes in negotiations.
Whereas Francis (1991), Olekalns and Weingart (2008) and
dair, Taylor, and Tinsley (2009) stress the tendency to adapt
nd overcompensate when negotiating with cultures of dif-
erent negotiation schemes. This paper suggests that there is
 cognitive part in the core of a bargaining game which will
end to lead to intercultural clashes even with the best inten-
ions to ﬁnd a cooperative solution. This is particularly clear
n a bazaar when buyer–seller negotiations clash due to differ-
nt concepts and styles. Building on an activity type focus for
ntercultural cognitive perspective together with a bargaining
odel, this paper stresses the multi-active section of the con-
eptual framework of intercultural negotiations (Ott, 2011). It
rticulates two levels of analysis (seller and buyer perspective) o w l e d g e 1 (2 0 1 6) 51–61 53
and comprises three distinct types of cultural strategic behav-
ior (linear-active/US, multi-active/Brazil, reactive/Japan). We
use Ott (2011) to further develop a model for multi-active bar-
gainers colliding with other cultural activity types.
Bargaining  literature
The classical literature of bargaining games with one-sided
incomplete information comprises articles by Rubinstein
(1982, 1985), Ausubel and Deneckere (1989a, 1989b), Admati
and Perry (1987), Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), Crampton
(1985, Chap. 8), Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983), Fudenberg,
Levine, and Tirole (1985, Chap. 5), Myerson (1985, Chap. 7).
Admati and Perry (1987, p. 321) pointed out that in the standard
bargaining game a ﬁxed time between offers is speciﬁed
exogenously whereas in real bargaining situations bargain-
ers may employ a number of strategies to affect the length
of time between offers. It could be that the bargainers do not
face each other throughout the bargaining process (commu-
nication by phone, etc.), a player can disappear for some time
for various reasons or could close communication channels
when it is his turn to make, receive or respond to an offer. Gul
and Sonnenschein (1985, p. 5) stated ‘delay to agreement can
only be explained by the time between offers’. Endogenous
time between offers can be an important strategic variable
in bargaining with incomplete information which was ana-
lyzed in Rubinstein (1985) and Admati and Perry (1987). Each
player can delay her response as long as she wishes (beyond
an exogenously ﬁxed minimum time unit) when it is her turn
to respond to an offer. There is the assumption that until
an offer has been made by the relevant player, the other
player must remain passive and cannot revise previous offers.
Using Ott (2011) and applying her framework to a situation
in which the seller is multi-active and delay is short in order
to reverse Admati and Perry’s (1987) delay assumption. There
will be uncertainty about the buyer who might react with
long-term or short-term valuation of the bargaining process.
A bargaining game with haggling is therefore the theoretical
underpinning for a bazaar setting.
Theoretically haggling has been rarely investigated, but
there are a few experiments which analyze haggling in exper-
iments (Cason, Friedman, & Milam, 2003; Milam, 2006). The
outcome is that there are inefﬁciencies. The insights gained
are derived from Rapoport et al. (1995) and Balakrishnan and
Eliashberg (1995) which combine bargaining models with an
experimental design. As their results show similarities to this
article the next step is a formal model for the cultural types of
bargaining. The proposition of a new way of analyzing inter-
national negotiations enables the study of the clash of cultural
types. A framework of a one-sided incomplete information
setting enlarges Ott (2011) to the degree that a multi-active
seller (in a bazaar) meets a buyer whose cultural proﬁle is
uncertain and vice versa.
Multi-active  bargaining  behavior  – values  andThe following bargaining games show the outcomes when the
seller or the buyer offers ﬁrst. These scenarios are dealt with
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Multi-Actives Haggling 
Cooperation
Outcome Negotiation process Initial offer 
Conflict 
Hurrying – Time is money Linear-Actives 
Holding on – Trust-building Reactives 
Fig. 1 – Conceptual framework for multi-active bargaining
ences in the value of time v (‘time is money’, ‘negotiation isbehavior.
from a formal approach bundling a multi-active seller mov-
ing ﬁrst and similarly for the multi-active buyer moving ﬁrst.
Hence, we  aim to show the dynamics in international negoti-
ations considering the different cultural activity types.
Ott (2011) draws on Lewis (2006) categories of linear-active,
multi-active and reactive cultures and created an intercultural
negotiation framework. Three main cultural activity groups
are distinguished: task-oriented, highly organized planners
(linear-active culture); people-oriented, loquacious ‘inter-
relators’ (multi-active culture); introvert, respect-oriented
listeners (reactive culture). Ott (2011) related these cultural
activity types with the empirical evidence to design a bar-
gaining framework. Table 1 outlines the empirical evidence
regarding the key properties of the three types.
This paper examines the clashes of pure types (such as
US-Americans, Japanese and Brazilians) analyzed in the inter-
national business literature and emphasizes the differences
between the respective bargaining behaviors. Consistent with
the choice of pure types, empirical studies in international
negotiations focus strongly on distinctive US and Japanese
negotiations (Adair & Brett, 2004, 2005; Adair, Weingart, &
Brett, 2007) and more  recently on US and Chinese (Lee,
Guang, & Graham, 2006) negotiations. Other cultures such
as Brazilian, Spanish and Israeli are also often included to
show US and Japanese bargaining (Adair & Brett, 2004, 2005;
Brett & Okumura, 1998; Chaney & Martin, 2004; Graham,
1985; Graham & Mintu-Wimsat, 1997; Graham et al., 1994;
Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, & Zamir, 1991; Salacuse,
1999). Adler, Graham, and Schwarz Gehrke (1987) distinguish
between the US, Canadian and Mexican negotiation style.
Using the cultural activity typology the difference between the
bargaining patterns of linear-active (US, Canada) and multi-
active (Mexican) behavior early on is striking. Volkema (1999)
emphasizes similarly the difference between US and Brazilian
negotiations, which can as well classify as linear-active versus
multi-active negotiations. In 2004, Volkema (2004) stresses his
results with an even larger dataset, but we can still classify
the linear-active, multi-active and reactive negotiators of his
nine-country analysis.
In the intercultural negotiation framework, cultural dif-
ferences in bargaining behavior are connected to the range
of the initial offer, the frequency of rejection, strategies of
concession-making and the valuation of time. Fig. 1 shows the
conceptual approach.Different bargaining strategies occur because of setting a
reasonable high price in order to get the desired price due to
the duration of the negotiation period and to the resulting n o w l e d g e 1 (2 0 1 6) 51–61
discounted value. For instance, a straight-forward approach
and the anticipation of a short bargaining period may result
in a lower initial offer and lower costs of time.
The negotiation rules include the range of price p and costs
of time as a discount factor ı, which will be introduced in
combination into this model. For our multi-active bargain-
ing analysis, the properties of the model, thus, comprise the
linear-active, multi-active and reactive type of player created
in the framework (Ott, 2011):
Assumption and Property 1 (Multi-active Players). Multi-active
players consider bargaining as art and a have long-term
perspective in bargaining. Emotional bargaining means a
high frequency of ‘Nos’ or rejection of offers. The multi-
active player has a medium-term orientation ı → 1, the time
between offers and concessions is short 0 <  ≤ 1, the bar-
gaining costs are high cH(t) and the length of negotiations
covers a long period t = {0, ∞}.
Assumption and Property 2 (Linear-active Players). Linear-
active players have high costs of bargaining and time is costly
which leads to a short-term perspective. The linear-active
player has a short-term perspective ı → 0, the offers and con-
cessions are posed with a short delay  → 0, the costs of
bargaining are cL(t) low due to the short time horizon and
ﬁnally the length of negotiations covers a short period t = {0,
N}. Acceptance leads to the end of the game and rejection to
a small number of counter-offer and sometimes as well to the
end of the game.
Assumption and Property 3 (Reactive Players). Reactive play-
ers have a long-term perspective in bargaining and opting out
after a long period of bargaining is possible. The reactive bar-
gaining type has a long-term perspective ı → 1, however the
delay between offers can be long  → 1, the bargaining costs
are high cH(t), outside options are relevant and even possible
after acceptance and the end of the game can be t = {0, ∞}.
As we  can now see it is important to distinguish between
the multi-active and the reactive type due to their different
strategic concept of delay regarding counter-offers and con-
cessions. This means that we can capture the role of ‘No’ and
the proneness to rejection in mathematical terms. The con-
ceptualization of the clashes between these pure types can be
seen in the following table. For the purpose of this paper, the
main focus is on multi-active bargaining behavior and the clashes
with linear-active and reactive types which are highlighted in
the grey-shaded area from Table 2 in Ott (2011).
Let us now consider the standard buyer–seller model to
show how the reservation price of the seller and buyer inﬂu-
ences the agreed price or contracted price (Raiffa, 1982). In
the standard buyer–seller negotiation literature (Raiffa, 1982;
Raiffa et al., 2002; Rapoport et al., 1995; Sebenius, 1992, 2009)
there is no distinction between different cultural ways of bar-
gaining and using differences in initial offers and bargaining
horizon. Our model adds to the standard model the differ-an art’, ‘patience is a virtue’) and the differences of the costs c
of the bargaining process which correlate with the differences
in cultural patterns of negotiating.
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Table 1 – Empirical evidence of cultural activity types.
Properties Linear-active USA Multi-active Brazil Reactive Japan Authors
First offer Ask  for fair price, close to
eventual solution
Ask  for more initially Ask for higher proﬁt solutions
when making initial offer
Graham (1985)
+5–10% +20–50% +10–20% Chaney and Martin (2004)
Priority information sharing
likely and directly
Priority  information sharing
less likely and indirectly
Adair and Brett (2004, 2005)
Second offer* Add to package to sweeten the
deal
−10% −5% Chaney and Martin (2004)
Final offer* Total package −25% No concessions Chaney and Martin (2004)
Four stages Low context reciprocate offers
less and priority information
more
High  context reciprocate offers
more and priority information
less
Adair et al. (2007)
Concessions Longer initial concessions
Early concessions
Initial  concessions are higher
More commands
Graham (1985)
Bartos (1978)
Silence 3.5/30 min None 5.5/30 min Graham (1985)
Word ‘No’ Less frequent use of the word
no
High frequency of the use of
no; not answer to a question
Less  frequent use of the word
no.
Graham (1985)
Disagreement rates: % of
offers rejected
28%  29% 22% Roth et al. (1991)
Proﬁts American buyers achieve
higher proﬁts than sellers
Japanese buyers achieve higher
proﬁts than sellers
Graham and Mintu-Wimsat
(1997)
Contract Contract means closing deal Primary goal is relationship
and not contract
Contract means opening
relationship
Salacuse (1999)
Time sensitivity 85% of Americans linear,
economic time
100%  of Brazilians 91% Japanese
cyclical-integrated time
Salacuse (1999)
Usunier (2003)
Source: Ott (2011).
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Table 2 – Buyer–seller model for different cultures in intercultural negotiations.
  Buyer 
Seller  
Buyer (Player II) 
Linear-activeCulture        Multi- activeCulture            
Re-activeCulture 
Linear-active  refinements  
culture 
Seller  
(Player I)    
Multi-
active  
culture 
Reacti ve  
Culture 
Similar cultural 
background with  
Scenario1 
Example: 
American Seller – 
German buyer 
‘Time is Money’ – 
Approach 
);v(p – –
– –
– –
– –
––
––
– –
– –
LLLL pc
Seller linear-
active and buyer  
multi-active 
Scenario 4 
Example:
American 
Seller – Brazilian 
buyer 
);v(p MMLL pc
Seller linear-
active and 
Buyer reactive 
Scenario 5 
Example:  
American Seller 
– Japanese buyer 
);v(p RRLL pc
Seller multi-active 
and buyer linear- 
active 
Scenario 6 
Example:
Brazilian Seller – 
American buyer 
);(p LLMM pvc
Similar 
cultural 
background with 
refinements  
Scenario 2 
Example: Arab
Seller – Brazilian 
buyer
‘Haggling’-
Approach 
);(p MMMM pvc
Seller multi-
active and buyer 
reacti ve 
Scenario 7 
Example:
Brazilian Seller – 
Japanese buyer 
);v(p RRMM pc
Seller reactive 
and buyer  
Linear-active 
Scenario 8 
Example: 
Japanese Seller – 
American buyer 
);v(p LLRR pc
Seller reactive 
And buyer  
Multi-active 
Scenario 9 
Example:
Japanese Seller – 
Brazilian  buyer 
);v(p MMRR pc
Similar cult ural 
background with 
refinement 
Scenario 3 
Example: 
Japanese Seller – 
Finnish buyer
‘Building trust’-
Approach Source: Ott (2011).
The initial offer of a linear-active bargainer is smaller than
the one of the multi-active and reactive players pR > pM > pL.
The counter-offer of a linear-active, multi-active and reactive
player shows the relationship p∗R > p
∗
M > p
∗
L; p
∗
R = max{vR, cR}
p∗M = max{vM, cM} p∗L = max{vL, cL} which maximizes the time
and costs of bargaining. The value of the time horizon v con-
siders the value v ∈ [0,  1] as a function of bargaining horizon
v(ıi) in which the discount factor ıi symbolizes patience and
impatience: v(ıR) > v(ıM) > v(ıL). The costs of bargaining for a
certain amount of time can be written as c(ıR) > c(ıM) > c(ıL).
Bargaining  models
The bargaining game starts at time zero, when it is the seller’s
turn to make an offer. Players make alternating offers until
they reach an agreement. A response to an offer involves
either an acceptance or a counteroffer, and it is made within
no shorter than a given length of time. The response can be
made at any time afterwards. The other player remains pas-
sive until an acceptance or counteroffer has been announced.– –
);v(p RRRR pc
The original offer cannot be revised after it has been made.
The ﬁrst offer in the game can be made at any time t ≥ 0.
Since the acceptance of an offer ends the game, a relevant
history for the game is a sequence of unacceptable offers and
a sequence of time between offers.
As this paper draws upon Rapoport et al. (1995) and
Balakrishnan and Eliashberg (1995), the trading rules are used
and reshaped for the purpose of creating a model for under-
standing multi-active buyer–seller bargaining games. This
paper’s bargaining rules are also adopted from Fudenberg et al.
(1985), Crampton (1985), Fudenberg et al. (1985), Rubinstein
(1985), Gul and Sonnenschein (1985), Admati and Perry (1987),
and Ausubel and Deneckere (1989a, 1989b).
The following scenarios are applications of the bargain-
ing games. Propositions and corollaries are adapted to the
activity-based types of bargaining with one-sided uncertainty
about the reservation values, such as the bargaining costs
and the value of time, and about the strategic delay. Using
the sequential equilibrium situation, we  move to the incom-
plete information situation by using the dynamic approach
by introducing ‘Nature’ as a dummy player for the one-sided
& k n o w l e d g e 1 (2 0 1 6) 51–61 57
i
g
m
t
m
a
b
u
o
p
a
d
w
p
t
l
t
e
p
m
c
I
i
d
d
c
g
s
e
c
f
t
t
n
i
t
u
a
t
a
t
f
M
L
t
2
b
P
i
o
i
P
ﬁ
e
Price offers 
Seller pM
Buyer
pL
PR
pM
Time δ
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ncomplete information scenarios below. We consider the bar-
aining power derived from the ﬁrst move of offering a price or
aking a proposal (either as a seller or as a buyer). This means
hat we can use, as well, uncertainty about the type of the ﬁrst
over and suggest how to move as a multi-active player in
 response scenario, which leads to a seller-offer game and
uyer-offer game. We adapt Rapoport et al. (1995) to our sit-
ation by stating our trading rules: (1) private information on
ne side; (2) no communication is allowed except price pro-
osal, acceptance and rejection; (3) the parties can be patient
nd impatient to enjoy the fruits of agreement, (note this is a
eviation from Rapoport et al. (1995)). In addition, we consider
hat might happen when both the informed and uninformed
arty make offers. We emphasize Rapoport et al.’s proposi-
ion of impatience as ‘costs of bargaining’ is considered for our
inear-active bargainers. Furthermore, an important feature is
hat the inﬂuence of time on bargaining could take on differ-
nt forms. It can be reﬂected in the discounting function if the
layers discount future beneﬁts. Secondly, the utility of agree-
ent may change with the date. Finally, there is usually ﬁxed
ost of bargaining that recurs at each stage of the negotiation.
n the present paper we study the variable costs of bargain-
ng in terms of uncertainty regarding the time horizon. Our
iscount value is the factor of time and ı = [1 − (1 − r)1/2]/r.
We add to Rapoport et al.’s work the idea that there are
ifferent activity types of sellers and buyers and the clash of
ulture of these differences has an impact on the length of bar-
aining, and on the likelihood of break-ups, stalemates and
uccess. Therefore, we  can see the agreement zone is inﬂu-
nced by the height of the ﬁrst offer, the concessions, the
osts and the value of bargaining as an indication of the dif-
erences of time horizons. As an additional step to capture
he differences of activity types, we  choose to analyze the cul-
ural clashes with the notation and logic of a process-oriented
egotiation analysis.
Let us, therefore, represent each player’s problem as choos-
ng the maximum (minimum) level to demand (offer), subject
o the constraints. We can therefore add what we  have come
p with in the section above relating to Characterization of Types
nd develop our models, respectively. This would mean that
he seller will maximize the demand (price minus  costs (p − c))
nd the buyer will minimize the offer (v − p). The height of ini-
ial prices, the length of bargaining and the costs and value
unctions will all differ according to the cultural types.
ulti-active  seller  games
et there be a multi-active seller with payoff USM = pM − cM,
he index M refers to the price margin given which is between
0 and 50% and uncertainty about the buyer’s value of the
argaining process with payoff UBLMR = v(ıi) − p.
roposition 1. If a multi-active seller makes the initial offer
n a seller-offer-game, then the uncertainty about the type
f the buyer will lead to a bargaining game with incomplete
nformation.roof. (1) The multi-active seller makes an initial offer pM. The
rst situation occurs when a multi-active seller sets pM and
xpects the buyer to negotiate over this price by rejecting orFig. 2 – Multi-active seller negotiates with LMR  buyer.
making a counter-offer. (2) Nature chooses type of buyer to be
either linear-active, multi-active or reactive v(ıi) = v(ıL, ıM, ıR).
(3) The buyer accepts or rejects the offer. (4) Acceptance ends
the game. In general, we have the following relationship of
reservation values to show acceptance of an offer v(ıi) ≥ p.
(5) Rejection leads to another offer by the multi-active seller
which will occur in a very short period of time. This is in a
seller-offer game. The multi-active seller will continue with
the game by offering again. The payoffs will be (USM = pM −
cM, U
B
LMR = v(ıi) − p).
When a multi-active seller offers price pM, then the uncer-
tainty about the buyer leads in cultural terms to differences in
the valuation of the bargaining process with the initial offer.
This means that, for linear-active and reactive types, the ini-
tial price offer does not ﬁt to their private values. Therefore,
rejection of the offer from the linear-active buyer will lead to
another offer by the multi-active seller in the way that hag-
gling lowers the initial price offer over time. However, the
reactive player will not reject to due to losing face, but will
delay the process – thus going counter to the strategic process
of bargaining of multi-active players. Differences in the valua-
tion lead to stalemates and break-ups. Fig. 2 shows the results
of Corollaries 1a, b and c.
Corollary 1a (Brazilian Seller – American Buyer). If a multi-
active seller and a linear-active buyer bargain over the price of
a good they want to trade, there will be a conﬂict due to the
low frequency of offers/counteroffers and a high probability of
acceptance of a high price without further bargaining.
Result. v(ıL) ≥ pM and the value of the bargaining process
is short for the linear-active player; therefore the costs are
lower for the linear-active buyer to negotiate for a short period,
whereas pM has a higher margin for the bargaining process. If
the linear-active accepts, then she pays a higher price than
necessary.
Corollary 1b (Brazilian Seller – Italian Buyer). If a multi-active
seller offers to a multi-active buyer, then rejection by a
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multi-active buyer will lead to a counter-offer in a very short
period of time.
Result. v(ıM) ≥ pM and the cultural costs of bargaining are
equal. This is the benchmark case for all other cultural models.
Corollary 1c ((Brazilian Seller – Japanese Buyer)). If a multi-
active seller and a reactive buyer bargain over the price of a
good they want to trade, there will a long period of bargaining.
Intuition. v(ıR) ≥ pM and the value of the bargaining process
is longer than the offered price pM can cover. The multi-active
seller will accept earlier than culturally perceived by the reac-
tive player. It will be too costly to hold out for the multi-
active.
Multi-active  buyer  games
Let there be the payoff function of a multi-active buyer UBM =
vM − pM and a randomized seller with USLMR = p − c(ıi). There is
uncertainty about the seller’s bargaining horizon and cost of
bargaining.
Proposition 2. If a multi-active buyer makes the initial offer
in a buyer-offer game, then the uncertainty about the type of
the seller will lead to a sequential equilibrium.
Proof. (1) The multi-active buyer makes an initial offer pM. (2)
Nature chooses the type of the buyer being either linear-active,
multi-active or reactive c(ıi) = c(ıL, ıM, ıR). (3) The linear-active,
multi-active or reactive seller will either accept or reject. (4)
Acceptance will end the game. In general, we  can write p ≥ c(ıi)
to reach an agreement. It is very unlikely that the multi-active
seller will accept the offer. (5) Rejection will lead to another
offer by the buyer in a buyer-offer game or a counter-offer in
an alternating offer game. Rejection by the seller will lead to a
quick succession of another buyer offer in case of the buyer-
offer game. The game continues. The payoffs will be (UBM =
vM − pM, USLMR = p − c(ıi)).
If the buyer moves ﬁrst and offers pM, uncertainty about
costs of bargaining for the seller is relevant and determines the
outcome. This means that the initial price offer is higher with
respect to the costs of the bargaining horizon and its coverage.
This means that the linear-active seller has lower costs of bar-
gaining and the reactive seller has higher costs and a longer
horizon to cover. There is again a high probability of dissat-
isfaction with the bargaining procedure for the multi-active
and linear-active partners and a high probability of failure
for the multi-active and reactive due to incompatibilities
(Fig. 3).
Corollary 2a (Brazilian Buyer – American Seller). If a multi-
active buyer offers price pM, the linear-active seller either
accepts or rejects in a short period of time.Result. pM ≥ c(ıL) and higher costs of bargaining of the multi-
active seller due to longer time horizon will clash with a
shorter horizon of the linear-active buyer who will accept orFig. 3 – Multi-active buyer negotiates with LMR  seller.
reject in a shorter time period. Acceptance and rejection of the
buyer will end the game.
Corollary 2b (Brazilian Buyer – Arab Seller). If a multi-active
buyer offers price pM, the multi-active seller will reject in a
short period of time and it leads to a quick offer-counter-offer
sequence with the intention to continue in an alternating offer
game of haggling.
pM − c(ıM) ≥ 0
Result. pM ≥ c(ıM) and same time horizon of multi-active sell-
ers and buyers will have similar costs of bargaining.
Corollary 2c (Brazilian Buyer – Japanese Seller). If a multi-
active buyer offers price pM, and rejection by the reactive seller
(if it happens) will lead to a counter-offer within a long period
of time or a sequence of offers by the buyer.
Result. pM ≥ c(ıR) and longer time horizon of reactive players
will lead to higher costs of bargaining, but they are covered
partially by the price of the multi-active buyer.
In summary, the results of multi-active bargaining in
Table 3 show the differences between different time horizons,
values and costs in international negotiations.
An  application  to  bargaining  in  the  bazaar
As another application of our model to export-import nego-
tiations, we show how negotiators from the UK and Malaysia
would behave in such a negotiation game.
Fig. 4 shows the application of the differences in nego-
tiating to a UK-Malaysian negotiation (Chuah et al., 2007;
Chuah, Hoffmann, Jones, & Williams, 2009) only over sev-
eral periods instead of an ultimatum game. It shows that the
UK importer–exporter relationship is clearly a short-termist
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Table 3 – Summary of multi-active bargaining behavior.
Finding Intuition
Seller-offer
Proposition 1: If USM → pM, then sequential Reservation price for buyer to accept
Corollary 1a: v(ıL) ≥ pM
Corollary 1b: v(ıM) ≥ pM
Corollary 1c: v(ıR) ≥ pM
Private value of the bargaining process
is:
Lower value of bargaining for
linear-active
Similar value for multi-actives
Higher value of bargaining for reactive
Buyer-offer
Proposition 2: If UBM → pM, then sequential Reservation price for seller to accept
Corollary 2a: pM ≥ c(ıL)
Corollary 2b: pM ≥ c(ıM)
Corollary 2c: pM ≥ c(ıR)
Private value of the strategic
delay/concessions:
Lower costs for linear-actives
Similar level of costs for multi-actives
Proposals 
Exporter
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Exporter UK
Importer UK
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process are lower than the price offered. This occurs particu-Fig. 4 – Application to the Malaysia-UK experiment.
linear-active) approach and the Malaysian importer–exporter
elationship is situated in the multi-active negotiation
pproach. Bringing together UK and Malaysian importers and
xporters, this will clearly explain what we  have found in the
orollaries and proofs (1a, 1b, 2a and 2b) from the seller and
uyer sections as a good example of the differences in costs
nd values.
Globalization has led to many  phenomena which have
n impact on managerial decision-making and strategic rea-
oning in a business context. Among the uncertainties of
usiness transactions across borders are risks with regards to
nternational negotiations. There are menus  of how to deal
ith people from or doing business in particular countries
hich cannot prevent misunderstandings. The break-up of
egotiations and deals, which might have been successful in
ne’s own culture, shows that the explanation comes from a
uch deeper cognitive level than any menu  would suggest.
he simple case of a short-term and long-term perspectives
f exporters and importers showed that the cultural behav-
oral patterns are linked to initial price offers, counter-offers,
oncessions, frequency of offer rejections and the costs of
argaining. The signaling effect of the initial price is a very
owerful mechanism to prevent failure.Higher costs for reactive
Discussion  and  conclusion
This paper analyzes the bargaining procedures of multi-
active sellers and buyers in one-sided incomplete information
games. The paper was structured into the literature review,
the description of international negotiation styles, the game
trees (time lines), the models of uncertainty and multi-active
bargaining in international negotiation analysis. The results
of the games showed equilibrium types and a possibility to
circumvent problems in international business negotiations
which are related to different time perceptions and strategic
behavior in this respect. It is important to anticipate the dead-
locks, stalemates and even break-ups when bargaining with
culturally programmed types.
In order to capture the speciﬁc characteristics of the
multi-active types, we split the scenarios in seller-dominated
situations either in which we know the ﬁrst movers as multi-
active or in which we had to randomize as LMR due to
uncertainty, but in this case the second mover was a multi-
active player. In the same way, we analyzed a buyer dominated
perspective. This offers us the possibility to see the multi-
active way of bargaining from various angles. Furthermore, we
solved the problem of bargaining between the three types in
an elegant way using corollaries to show the strategies of each
type. We  are now able to predict the culturally determined
ways of moving in an international setting. The intuition
behind the results shows that cultural patterns of offering,
accepting and rejecting as well as counter-offering can lead to
the anticipation of moves. Most importantly, we  are able to see
the value and costs of the bargaining process for the strategic
moves of the players and their inﬂuence on the way proposals
and counter-proposals are used.
This paper’s analysis offers an opportunity to see that
multi-active types will continue bargaining when there is a
linear-active bargainer who considers rejection as the end of
the game or will accept at an earlier stage than the multi-
active player. We can call this ‘costs of cultural bargaining’.
This is the case when the private values of the bargaininglarly when the multi-active seller offers ﬁrst. Additionally, the
multi-active bargaining horizon looks shorter in comparison
with the reactive time perspective. In this case, the high
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frequency of rejection of the multi-active player will collide
with a more  patient approach and a lower concession rate
of the reactive player. The bargaining strategies will, here,
be leading to a deadlock, a break-up of negotiations or a
relationship building process. The latter shows a more  stable
solution and an equilibrium in the long run.
Our model was applied to bargaining in a Bazaar which
featured all three types and the outcome is in favor of a long-
term approach. The limitations of the analysis are that we
were using a ﬁeld study example to analyze our theoretical
outcomes. Future research can use this research design to
investigate multi-active bargaining behavior in experiments.
Our results are not only useful for export and import nego-
tiations, but also for negotiations in MNEs and international
collaborations. The applicability to negotiations between
MNEs with headquarters in multi-active European countries
(i.e. Italy, Spain) and their hosts in the USA, Japan and China
can lead to a better understanding between multi-active types
in the HQs and linear and/or reactive subsidiaries/hosts and
vice versa for HQs based in linear-active or reactive cultures
(USA, Japan, China) with subsidiaries in multi-active cultures
(Southern Europe, Middle East, Latin America).
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